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Reconciling the Principled Approach
to Hearsay with the Rule of Law†
Andrew Botterell*∗

I. INTRODUCTION
My goal in this paper is to argue that the principled approach to hearsay is consistent with the rule of law. My argument has three main parts.
In the first part I contrast two conceptions of the rule of law, one that
views it in an instrumental manner and another that views it primarily in
normative terms. I argue that the normative conception is preferable. In
the second part I describe and discuss the principled approach to hearsay.
In the third part, I link the first part to the second by arguing that if the
rule of law expresses certain normative ideals, then there is no tension
between the principled approach to hearsay and the rule of law.
That said, the connection between the three parts of the argument is
complicated. At a very general level, I want to argue that both the rule of
law and the principled approach to hearsay express certain normative
principles or ideals. The rule of law describes an abstract moral relation that
holds between individuals by virtue of those individuals occupying certain
legally defined roles. The principled approach to hearsay requires that
judges adopt a certain ethical stance towards trial participants, a stance that
manifests an attitude of respect and concern for the participants’ interests. In
my view, it is these normative considerations that make it possible to
reconcile the rule of law with the principled approach to hearsay. So my
argument depends on adopting particular interpretations of both the rule of
law and the principled approach to hearsay. However, articulating and
†
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defending these interpretations takes some work. With respect to the rule of
law, I do this by contrasting Joseph Raz’s instrumental conception of the
rule of law with Lon Fuller’s interpretation, and then moving from Fuller’s
interpretation to Michael Oakeshott’s conception of the rule of law as an
abstract form of moral association. With respect to the principled approach
to hearsay, I reveal its normative dimension by appealing to a distinction
between internal and external perspectives on the criminal trial process.
This yields the conclusion that the principled approach to hearsay expresses
the same kinds of normative considerations that animate Oakeshott’s
conception of the rule of law and thus, that the principled approach to
hearsay is consistent with the rule of law.
My argument is developed in part in response to Colin Tapper’s recent argument that, because it results in uncertainty and unpredictability,
and because it leaves too much power in the hands of judges, the principled approach to hearsay is inconsistent with the rule of law.1 Tapper’s
argument fails, I argue, because it misrepresents the content of the principled approach but more importantly, because it relies on a questionable
conception of the rule of law. Responding to Tapper’s criticisms of the
principled approach to hearsay will enable me to flesh out these admittedly sketchy references to normative ideals, ethical stances and forms of
moral association. That is the outline of my argument.
Before continuing, however, it pays to ask: Why bother trying to reconcile the principled approach to hearsay with the rule of law? What
hangs on the resolution of this issue? Let me make two observations.
First, the principled approach to hearsay marks an important development in the Canadian law of evidence. By focusing on the indicia of
necessity and reliability, the principled approach to hearsay unifies what
initially appear to be disparate rules and exceptions, and articulates a
conception of the broader principles that underlie the hearsay rule. Time
spent understanding the principles that ground the principled approach to
hearsay is therefore time well spent. Second, whatever else it is, the rule
of law is a virtue of a legal system. Although some, such as Joseph Raz,
have questioned the scope and centrality of this virtue, virtually everybody agrees that a legal system or rule that offends the rule of law is for
that reason defective. So demonstrating that the principled approach to
hearsay is consistent with the rule of law goes some way towards showing that the principled approach reflects fundamental principles of justice
1

Colin Tapper, “The Law of Evidence and the Rule of Law” (2009) 68 Cambridge L.J. 67
[hereinafter “Tapper”].
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and legality. In short, if one is attracted to the principled approach to
hearsay — as I am — it would surely be a good thing to show that it is
consistent with the rule of law, a concept that reflects core legal virtues.
These considerations are the impetus for the discussion that follows.

II. TRUTH AND NORMATIVITY IN THE CRIMINAL TRIAL
Although my eventual goal is to discuss the relationship between the
principled approach to hearsay and the rule of law, let me begin by
briefly considering the purpose of the criminal trial.
It is often said that the criminal trial is primarily an epistemic enterprise that is designed to determine the truth. For example, Cory J.
claimed that “[t]he ultimate aim of any trial, criminal or civil, must be
to seek and to ascertain the truth”.2 Justice Lewis Powell, dissenting in
Bullington v. Missouri, said the following:
Underlying the question of guilt or innocence is an objective truth: the
defendant, in fact, did or did not commit the acts constituting the crime
charged. From the time the accused is first suspected to the time the
decision on guilt or innocence is made, our criminal justice system is
designed to enable the trier of fact to discover the truth according to law.3

And in his important book, Truth, Error, and Criminal Law, Larry
Laudan argues that “a criminal trial is first and foremost an epistemic
engine, a tool for ferreting out the truth from what will often initially be a
confusing array of clues and indicators”.4 According to this picture, the
point of the criminal trial is primarily epistemological: to determine what
actually happened.
This is a familiar picture. But while there is much to recommend it, it
nonetheless misses something important about the criminal trial in
particular and the criminal justice system in general. What it misses is that
the criminal trial is a normative enterprise, the primary aim of which is to
determine whether the punishment of the accused is justified, whether the
coercive force of the state has been rightly brought to bear on a particular
accused. This is what I mean when I say that the point of the criminal trial
is normative. The criminal trial is not designed primarily to determine what

2

R. v. Nikolovski, [1996] S.C.J. No. 122, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1197, at para. 13 (S.C.C.).
451 U.S. 430, at 450 (1981).
4
Larry Laudan, Truth, Error, and Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal Epistemology
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), at 2 [hereinafter “Laudan”] (emphasis in original).
3
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has happened, although it sometimes does that; nor is it designed to simply
punish those who do wrong, although it sometimes does that too. Rather,
the criminal trial is designed to impose punishment on wrongdoers, and to
do so in a manner that is consistent with principles of justice. The point of
the criminal trial, in short, is to reach a just verdict.
That the criminal trial is primarily a normative enterprise rather than a
truth-seeking one can be seen by considering the following. First, we sometimes know what happened even before a trial begins. This suggests that the
point of the trial cannot be to determine the truth since in such cases the truth
is already known. Second, there are cases where we do not know what happened, but a determination of guilt is justified nonetheless. Suppose, for
example, that A and B engage in a gunfight on a busy street, that C is shot
and killed, and that at trial it is impossible to determine which of A or B fired
the shot that killed C. It might be appropriate nonetheless to find both A and
B are guilty of murder on the grounds that they intentionally engaged in a
mutual gunfight, and so are responsible in law for the unlawful actions of
each other.5 If the principal point of the criminal trial is to find out the truth,
this sort of situation would make little sense, for how could a verdict be
reached when there is still a question about what actually occurred?
I do not mean to suggest that rules of evidence do not have a truthseeking component or function. Somebody attracted to an epistemic view
of the criminal trial could certainly agree that the criminal trial includes a
normative component while also maintaining that that component cannot
be satisfied unless it is known beyond a reasonable doubt what actually
happened. Recall Powell J.’s remark in Bullington v. Missouri. What he
in fact says is that the “criminal justice system is designed to enable the
trier of fact to discover the truth according to law.” The qualification “according to law” is important since it indicates that it may not be truth
simpliciter that is of interest. For example, we may not know as a matter
of fact whether A or B fired the shot that killed C; but we may know all
the same that both A and B are as a matter of law guilty of murder. Still,
while a trial can have both normative and truth-seeking elements, its
normative function is primary. This is significant, since it means that
epistemic justifications of the rules of evidence should be subordinated to
normative justifications of those same rules. Even if a particular rule of
evidence is truth-conducive, and so justified from an epistemic perspective, it may be unjustified from a normative perspective if it fails to

5

See, e.g., R. v. R. (J.S.), [2008] O.J. No. 5505, 2008 ONCA 544 (Ont. C.A.).
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safeguard certain rights of the accused, or makes it less likely that any
verdict reached and punishment imposed will be morally justified.6

III. EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL PERSPECTIVES ON
THE CRIMINAL TRIAL
In A Philosophy of Evidence Law, Ho Hock Lai usefully distinguishes two perspectives that one might adopt with respect to the trial
process.7 Ho calls the first perspective the external perspective of the system engineer; for simplicity, I will call it the external perspective.
According to this perspective, “the trial should be regulated such that it
will best achieve its goals”, chief among which “is the discovery of truth
in disputes of fact”.8 From the external perspective, individual rules of
evidence and procedure should be evaluated based on their tendency to
determine the truth; equivalently, the design of a legal system should be
guided by the principle that rules should be selected based on their tendency to decrease the rate of errors. Thus, from the point of view of the
external perspective, rules of evidence and procedure will be well designed if they tend to “ferret out” the truth. The external perspective is
the perspective adopted by Laudan in Truth, Error, and Criminal Law.
This can be seen in his remark that the central question for legal epistemology is whether trial systems that “purport to be seeking the truth are
well engineered to lead to true beliefs about the world”.9
Ho contrasts the external perspective with what he calls the internal
perspective of the fact-finder as a moral agent; for simplicity, I will call it
the internal perspective. The core insight of the internal perspective is that
the perspective that ought to be adopted when thinking about the trial
process in particular, and the legal system in general, is one that views
judges as role-players within a system and procedural and evidential rules

6
For a similar sort of argument, see Hamish Stewart, “The Law of Evidence and the
Protection of Rights” [hereinafter “Stewart”] in James Stribopoulos & François Tanguay-Renaud,
eds., Rethinking Criminal Law Theory (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012) 177.
7
Ho Hock Lai, A Philosophy of Evidence Law: Justice in the Search for Truth (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008) [hereinafter “Ho”]. To be precise, Ho discusses two perspectives that one might
adopt with respect to the fact-finding process. As it is understood by Ho, however, the fact-finding process
includes what we would ordinarily call matters of law in addition to matters of fact — for example, a
judge’s decision to exclude certain evidence on the grounds that it is hearsay, or on the grounds that it
would unduly prejudice the deliberations of the jury, is treated by Ho as part of the fact-finding process.
8
Id., at 46-47.
9
Laudan, supra, note 4, at 2.
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as normative. This is in contrast to the view that judges are disinterested
epistemic engineers viewing the system from the outside, and that
procedural and evidential rules are directed towards epistemic ends. As Ho
puts it:
Instead of assessing evidentiary rules functionally, as means of
achieving specified ends, they are evaluated modally, as constituting
features of a rational form of moral engagement between the court and
the persons brought before it. This kind of evaluation is conceptual in
nature and is founded on normative arguments; it is not contingent on
the validity of empirical assumptions connecting means and ends.10

From this perspective, the worth of a particular rule of evidence is not
solely a function of its tendency to contribute to epistemic goals. Rather,
rules of evidence must be assessed in terms of their role in a system that
is designed to justify the state’s imposition of punishment on an accused.
Says Ho, the “rightness of a rule is not determined by the consequences
that flow from its application but is inherent in the values it expresses”
where those values are intrinsic to the rule itself.11 Thus, even if a given
evidential rule has detrimental epistemic consequences, it might nonetheless be justified if it expresses a value that is integral to the trial process.
As Ho eloquently puts it, according to the internal perspective “[t]he
court must not only find truth in order to reach a just outcome, it must
also do justice in the course of ascertaining the truth”.12

IV. THE RULE OF LAW
To this point I have argued that the trial process is best viewed in
normative rather than epistemological terms, and I have appealed to
Ho Hock Lai’s distinction between external and internal perspectives on
that process. What I would like to do now is turn to a discussion of the
rule of law. I will contrast two conceptions of the rule of law, a normative
conception and an instrumental one, and I will argue that the normative
conception of the rule of law is to be preferred. I will do this by appealing to a picture of the rule of law found in the works of Lon Fuller and
Michael Oakeshott. I will suggest that the best conception of the rule of
law is one that views it as a moral relation that holds between persons in

10
11
12

Ho, supra, note 7, at 48.
Id.
Id., at 49.
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virtue of those individuals occupying certain roles. This conception,
I claim, is superior to an instrumental conception for several reasons. First,
it accounts for the very plausible idea that the rule of law constrains the
actions of individuals because of the role occupied by those individuals.
For example, a judge acts contrary to the rule of law when her ostensibly
judicial pronouncements and decisions go beyond the scope of the authority conferred on her by occupying the role of judge. And second, the
moral relation conception of the rule of law is superior to the instrumental conception because it articulates a more general vision of the rule of
law. It is general in that it is one that applies not only to judges, politicians and legislators, but also to private citizens in their interactions with
other private actors. It therefore makes sense of the often-overlooked fact
that the rule of law has both public law and private law dimensions.13
That said, it is notoriously difficult to say what the rule of law is.
This is because different people mean many different things by it. For
example, some think that the rule of law is either trivial or false. For if
the rule of law means that government must be by law and not by human
beings, then on one reading this claim is false, since government must be
by both law and human beings. On another reading, however, it is trivial,
since by definition a decree or command that is not authorized by law is
not a decree or command of a government acting as a government, and
so cannot constitute a law at all.14 Others seem to think that the rule of
law is all the law that we need. Here I have in mind T.R.S. Allen, who
argues that from the rule of law can be derived most (all?) of the normative and structural principles characteristic of a liberal democratic state,
including the separation of powers and the principle of formal equality.15
Despite this lack of consensus regarding the structure and content of
the rule of law, however, some general comments can be made. Commentators tend to draw (at least) a four-fold distinction: between formal
and substantive versions of the rule of law on the one hand, and between

13
For discussion of the importance of the rule of law in private law, see the papers collected
in Lisa Austin & Dennis Klimchuk, eds., The Rule of Law and Private Law (Oxford University
Press, forthcoming).
14
See “The Rule of Law and Its Virtue” in Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on
Law and Morality, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 210, at 212 [hereinafter “Raz”].
15
For example, T.R.S. Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). See also T.R.S. Allan, “The Rule of Law as Liberal
Justice” (2006) 56 U.T.L.J. 283; and “Dworkin and Dicey: The Rule of Law as Integrity” (1988) 8
Oxford J. Legal Stud. 266.
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thick and thin formulations on the other.16 Formal versions of the rule of
law view the rule of law in procedural terms, insisting that the rule of law
is an instrument by and through which governments rule. Substantive
versions of the rule of law, on the other hand, view the rule of law as embodying rights of one sort or another: personal and property rights,
democratic rights, rights to dignity, substantive equality and so on. Thin
substantive versions of the rule of law tend to include only individual
rights, while thick — or thicker — versions include democratic and dignity rights. Conversely, thin formal versions of the rule of law embody
minimal procedural rights, while thick — or thicker — versions require
more restrictions on the sort of laws, or rules, by and through which governments can rule. Paul Craig summarizes this general picture in the
following passage:
Formal conceptions of the rule of law address the manner in which the
law was promulgated …; the clarity of the ensuing norm …; and the
temporal dimension of the enacted norm ... Formal conceptions of the
rule of law do not however seek to pass judgment upon the actual
content of the law itself … Those who espouse substantive conception
of the rule of law seek to go beyond this. They accept that the rule of
law has the formal attributes mentioned above, but they wish to take the
doctrine further. Certain substantive rights are said to be based on, or
derived, form the rule of law. The concept is used as the foundation for
these rights, which are then used to distinguish between “good” laws,
which comply with such rights, and “bad” laws which do not.17

A relatively thin and formal conception of the rule of law can be
found in the work of Joseph Raz. In “The Rule of Law and its Virtue”,
Raz argues that while the rule of law is a virtue of legal systems, “the
rule of law is just one of the virtues which our legal system may possess
and by which it is to be judged.”18 As he goes on to argue:
Regarding the rule of law as the inherent or specific virtue of law is a
result of an instrumental conception of law. The law is not just a fact of
life. It is a form of social organization which should be used properly
for the proper ends. It is a tool in the hands of men differing from many
16

For a more detailed discussion, see Brian Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History,
Politics, Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). For criticism of this way of
sketching the logical geography, see Peter Rijpkema, “The Rule of Law Beyond Thick and Thin”
(2013) 32 Law & Phil. 793.
17
Paul Craig, “Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical
Framework” (1997) 21 P.L. 467, at 467.
18
Raz, supra, note 14, at 210.
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others in being versatile and capable of being used for a large variety of
proper purposes. As with some other tools, machines, and instruments a
thing is not of the kind unless it has at least some ability to perform its
function. A knife is not a knife unless it has some ability to cut. The
law to be law must be capable of guiding behavior, however
inefficiently. Like other instruments, the law has a specific virtue which
is morally neutral in being neutral as to the end to which the instrument
is put. It is the virtue of efficiency; the virtue of the instrument as an
instrument. For the law this virtue is the rule of law. Thus the rule of
law is an inherent virtue of the law but not a moral virtue as such.19

This conception of the rule of law is instrumental and morally neutral; or
in the terminology introduced above, it is formal and thin.
In contrast, Ronald Dworkin endorses a substantive and thick conception of the rule of law. As he says in articulating the so-called “rights
conception” of the rule of law, this conception
assumes that citizens have moral rights and duties with respect to one
another, and political rights against the state as a whole. It insists that
these moral and political rights be recognized in positive law, so that
they may be enforced upon the demand of individual citizens through
courts or other judicial institutions of the familiar type, so far as this is
practicable. The rule of law on this conception is the idea of rule by an
accurate public conception of individual rights. It does not distinguish,
as the [formal] conception does, between the rule of law and
substantive justice; on the contrary it requires, as part of the ideal of
law, that the rules … capture and enforce moral rights.20

The rights conception of the rule of law is substantive because it requires
the rule of law to “capture and enforce moral rights”. It is thick because
the rights that the rule of law seeks to capture and enforce are robust.
But another conception of the rule of law is available, one that appears
to combine the formal with the substantive. I have in mind Lon Fuller’s
conception of the rule of law as expressed in The Morality of Law.21 It is
natural to interpret Fuller as articulating a formal conception of the rule of
law, given that his eight ways make law appear to be procedural in nature.22

19

Id., at 226.
Ronald Dworkin, “Political Judges and the Rule of Law”, in A Matter of Principle
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), at 11-12 (emphasis in original).
21
Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964) [hereinafter
“Fuller”].
22
Fuller’s eight principles are as follows: (1) Generality — legal systems should achieve
general rules; (2) Promulgation — laws should be published; (3) Prospectivity — laws should be
20
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For example, the claim that laws must be public, non-retroactive and
general suggests that what matters from the perspective of the rule of law,
or the principle of legality, is the form that the laws take, rather than the
content that they have. However, Fuller is also clear that in his view that
these principles constitute an internal or inner morality of law.23 To be sure
Fuller’s argument is interesting in its own right, and much has been written
about it.24 However, my interest in it has to do with the fact that in my view
it leads naturally to Oakeshott’s conception of the rule of law as a form of
moral association. Thus, in the next few pages I will sketch a way of
thinking about Fuller’s view of the relationship between law and morality
that dovetails with Oakeshott’s conception of the rule of law. This is
important for my argument, first, because Oakeshott’s conception of the
rule of law represents a sophisticated and attractive normative conception of
the rule of law, and second, because it is the conception of the rule of law
that I will appeal to when criticizing Tapper’s objection to the principled
approach to hearsay. In short, from Fuller we get a novel account of the
relationship between law and morality; that account leads naturally to
Oakeshott’s normative conception of the rule of law; and Oakeshott’s
normative conception is central to my argument that the principled
approach to hearsay is compatible with the rule of law.
So let me turn, all too briefly, to Fuller and Oakeshott. The first
thing to emphasize when considering Fuller’s views on the relationship
between law and morality is that law makes possible certain forms of
moral interaction,25 and that the forms of moral interaction made possible
by principles of legality — i.e., the rule of law — apply to individuals by

prospective rather than retrospective; (4) Clarity — laws should be clearly stated and
understandable; (5) Compatibility — laws should be compatible with one another; (6) Possibility —
laws should not command the impossible; (7) Constancy —laws should not be subject to constant
change; and (8) Congruence — consistency between the law as declared and the law as
administered.
23
Fuller, supra, note 21, at 153.
24
For extended discussion of Fuller’s views on the rule of law and the inner morality of the
law, see Alan R. Mabe, “The Relationship of Law and Morality” (1974) 12 Southern Journal of
Philosophy 71 and “Fuller and the Internal Morality of Law” (1975) 13 Southern Journal of
Philosophy 515; Christine Pierce, “Mabe on Fuller” (1975) 13 Southern Journal of Philosophy 511;
Peter Nicholson, “The Internal Morality of Law: Fuller and His Critics” (1974) 84 Ethics 307; and
Frederick Schauer, “Fuller’s Internal Point of View” (1994) 13 Law & Phil. 285.
25
As Fuller puts it, “[t]o live the good life requires … the support of firm base lines for
human interaction, something that — in a modern society at least — only a sound legal system can
supply”. See Fuller, supra, note 21, at 205. Thus, while Fuller talks in The Morality of Law of the
morality that makes law possible, it is perhaps more appropriate to think of Fuller as describing the
law that makes morality possible.
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virtue of those individuals occupying certain roles or offices: “If respect
for the principles of legality is essential to produce [a legal] system, then
certainly it does not seem absurd to suggest that these principles constitute a special morality of role attaching to the office of law-maker and
law-administrator.”26 This is Fuller’s first idea: the rule of law is or expresses a morality of role.
Fuller then draws a distinction between two kinds of social ordering:
managerial direction and law, a distinction that I will suggest is also
found in Oakeshott’s discussion of the rule of law. Says Fuller:
A general and summary statement of the distinction between the two
forms of social ordering might run somewhat as follows: The directives
issued in a managerial context are applied by the subordinate in order
to serve a purpose set by his superior … The rules of a legal system, on
the other hand, normally serve the primary purpose of setting the
citizen’s relations with other citizens and only in a collateral manner his
relations with the seat of authority from which the rules proceed.27

That is, legal rules are designed in the first instance to structure the relationships between persons qua citizens. Consequently, for Fuller “law is
not, like management, a matter of directing other persons how to accomplish tasks set by a superior, but is basically a matter of providing the
citizenry with a sound and stable framework for their interactions with
one another”.28 On this view, the rule of law has no purpose apart from
“setting the citizen’s relations with other citizens”. Which particular interactions individual citizens engage in are up to them: they can get
married, buy a house or drive a car. With respect to these ends the law is
indifferent. When citizens do act, however, the principle of legality requires them to act in a way that is consistent with the framework of
relations that is constituted by the law.
In my view, Fuller’s account of the rule of law leads naturally to
Oakeshott. Like Fuller, Oakeshott also drew a distinction between
two forms of social ordering, which he called telocracy and nomocracy.
Roughly, telocracy describes a form of government primarily concerned
with fostering particular ends, while nomocracy describes a form of
government primarily concerned with promulgating particular rules.
Thus, for Oakeshott telocracy meant the proper business of government

26
27
28

Id., at 206.
Id., at 207-208 (emphasis in original).
Id., at 210.
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“understood as the organization of the energies and activities of its subjects, and of the resources of its territory, for the achievement of a single,
premeditated end”.29 Nomocracy, on the other hand, consists in the belief
that the role of the state is to enable certain interactions between individuals, regardless of the ends pursued by those individuals.30 We are
now in a position to see what links Fuller and Oakeshott, namely, the
idea that the rule of law relates citizens to one another in a nonteleological or non-instrumental manner via the mediation of the concept
of a role (or what Oakeshott calls a persona). More specifically, for
Oakeshott:
The expression “the rule of law”, taken precisely, stands for a mode of
moral association exclusively in terms of the recognition of the
authority of known, non-instrumental rules (that is, laws) which impose
obligations to subscribe to adverbial conditions in the performance of
the self-chosen actions of all who fall within their jurisdiction … Like
all other modes of association it is an abstract relationship of personae
— persons solely in respect of being alike and without exception the
subjects of these obligations to one another.31

Thus, says Oakeshott, the rule of law is a mode of moral association.
It is an abstract form of relationship insofar as it is a relationship not of
persons but of persons occupying roles. And it is a form of moral relationship because it involves an obligation to subscribe to and obey
certain non-instrumental rules, namely, laws.32
To sum up, I have drawn a distinction between conceptions of the
rule of law that locate its virtue in its ability to guide conduct towards a
particular end, and conceptions of the rule of law that locate its virtue in
its ability to regulate the interactions between citizens regardless of the
ends that they choose to pursue. The latter, I take it, is what Oakeshott
29
Michael Oakeshott, Lectures in the History of Political Thought (Exeter, UK: Imprint
Academic, 2006), at 471.
30
According to Oakeshott, nomocracy takes government “1) to be the custodian of a system of
legal rights and duties in the enjoyment and observation of which the subjects of the government may
pursue their own chosen ends and purposes while still remaining a single association. 2) to be the
custodian of the interests of the association in relation to other similar associations”: id., at 483-84.
31
Michael Oakeshott, “The Rule of Law” in Michael Oakeshott, On History and Other
Essays (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983) 119, at 136.
32
This might lead one to suppose that the conception of the rule of law that Oakeshott is
proposing is a thick one. But this seems to be a mistake, for as Oakeshott famously says, “the rule of
law bakes no bread, it is unable to distribute loaves or fish (it has none), and it cannot protect itself
against external assault, but it remains the most civilized and least burdensome conception of the
state yet to be devised”: id., at 164.
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has in mind when he talks about the rule of law as a mode of moral association. This conception of the rule of law is, I think, a powerful and
attractive one, for reasons mentioned above: it makes sense of the very
plausible idea that the rule of law constrains the actions of individuals by
virtue of the role occupied by those individuals, and it articulates a vision
of the rule of law according to which it governs not only state actors, but
also private citizens. And it is this conception of the rule of law that will
enable me to discuss my main topic, which is whether the Supreme Court
of Canada’s principled approach to hearsay is compatible with the rule
of law.

V. EVIDENCE LAW AND HEARSAY
What I would like to do now is turn to a recent criticism of the
Supreme Court of Canada’s hearsay jurisprudence. The criticism I have
in mind is found in Colin Tapper’s paper “The Law of Evidence and
the Rule of Law”.33 Tapper’s conclusion on the relationship between the
law of evidence and the rule of law is largely negative. According to him
the law of evidence
seems to be developing in a way quite antithetic to the classic
conception of the rule of law. This can be seen in the blurring of the
distinction between the admissibility and the admission of pieces of
evidence; and the readiness of the courts to reject rules, both statutory
and common law, in favor of discretion, both explicit and implicit in
the use of vague and imprecise terminology; and in insulation from
appeal of decisions by trial judges.34

My argument will be simple. I will present Tapper’s criticism, indicate the extent to which it relies on an instrumental conception of the rule
of law, and then suggest that if Oakeshott’s conception of the rule of law
is adopted, Tapper’s criticism loses much of its force. So let me turn to
Tapper’s argument.
Tapper begins with the particular theory of the rule of law. According
to this theory the enterprise of law “can be regarded as one of governing
human beings by the translation of moral values and prescriptions into
justiciable rules, that is to say by rules which can be understood and applied both by those subject to them and by those applying them. It is an
33
34

Tapper, supra, note 1.
Id., at 67.
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exercise in particularization”.35 The rule of law, in other words, involves
articulating rules and applying them in concrete situations. But the rule
of law will be observed only in so far as those rules are applied consistently and objectively. This leads Tapper to conclude that
to maintain the rule of law to its greatest extent, the input of the
judiciary should be kept as close as possible to the minimum required
to allow the system to function. In this sense it can aspire to be seen as
government by law, and not by men; by articulated rules and not by
some form of palm tree justice.36

In short, according to Tapper, the more input judges have into the criminal justice system — and in particular, into the criminal trial — the less
likely it is that the rule of law will be upheld. This is so in part because
the more input judges have into the criminal justice system the more difficult it will be to predict with certainty how individual rules will be
applied and what the outcome of any particular application of those rules
will be. Tapper continues:
[T]he most egregious example in the law of evidence in this respect is
to be seen in the deliberate decision of the Supreme Court of Canada to
abandon “categorical” approach to the hearsay rule, and to substitute an
approach dubbed “principled”.37

What is the principled approach to hearsay? Let me approach this
question by first considering the basic rule of evidence, which holds that
all relevant evidence is presumptively admissible. Hearsay statements
constitute an exception to this rule. To see why, consider a definition: a
statement constitutes hearsay where (1) it is made expressly or impliedly
by A out of court; where (2) it is offered in court in order to prove the truth
of its contents; but where (3) there is no opportunity to contemporaneously
cross-examine A on the making of the statement.38 Now consider the rule:
any such out-of-court statement is presumptively inadmissible.39 Why?
35

Id.
Id., at 68.
37
Id., at 71.
38
“The essential defining features of hearsay are therefore the following: (1) the fact that
the statement is adduced to prove the truth of its contents and (2) the absence of a contemporaneous
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant”: R. v. Khelawon, [2006] S.C.J. No. 57, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787, at
para. 35 (S.C.C.), per Charron J. [hereinafter “Khelawon”].
39
Really, then, the hearsay rule is not so much a rule of exclusion, but a rule of use: an
out-of-court statement is hearsay, and so presumptively inadmissible, if it is sought to be introduced
into evidence to establish the truth of its content. If, however, it is introduced into evidence for some
other purpose then it is not properly characterized as hearsay, and so is presumptively admissible.
36
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Because the lack of contemporaneous cross-examination renders the
statement untrustworthy. As Charron J. put it in Khelawon:
Our adversary system puts a premium on the calling of witnesses, who
testify under oath or solemn affirmation, whose demeanour can be
observed by the trier of fact, and whose testimony can be tested by
cross-examination. We regard this process as the optimal way of testing
testimonial evidence. Because hearsay evidence comes in a different
form, it raises particular concerns.40

So we have a general rule: hearsay statements are presumptively inadmissible. But we also have exceptions to the hearsay rule (which is
itself an exception to the basic rule of evidence). Historically, these exceptions were assessed using the categorical approach to hearsay
according to which, if a hearsay statement falls within one of the traditional exceptions or categories then it may be admitted into evidence
provided its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effects.41
The principled approach to hearsay overturned this familiar picture.
The principled approach was first considered by the Supreme Court in
R. v. Khan42 and R. v. Smith,43 was revisited in R. v. Starr44 and
R. v. Mapara,45 and has received its most extensive recent treatment in
Khelawon.46 The principled approach derives from statements made by
Wigmore in Wigmore on Evidence. There Wigmore said the following:
The needless obstruction to investigation of truth caused by the hearsay
rule is due mainly to the inflexibility of its exceptions, to the rigidly
technical construction of those exceptions by the courts, and to the
enforcement of the rule when its contravention would do no harm, but
would assist in obtaining a complete understanding of the transaction.47

Wigmore’s suggestion was that the inflexibility of the exceptions
could be remedied by focusing on criteria of necessity and reliability.
The Supreme Court built on Wigmore’s insights in Khan, Smith, Starr,
40

Supra, note 38, at para. 35.
The traditional exceptions or categories include statements against interest by
non-parties, party admissions, dying declarations, and spontaneous statements.
42
[1990] S.C.J. No. 81, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Khan”].
43
[1992] S.C.J. No. 74, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 915 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Smith”].
44
[2000] S.C.J. No. 40, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 144 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Starr”].
45
[2005] S.C.J. No. 23, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 358 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mapara”].
46
Supra, note 38. For a more recent discussion, see R. v. Baldree, [2013] S.C.J. No. 35,
2013 SCC 35 (S.C.C.).
47
John Henry Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed. (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1940),
vol. 5, at para. 1427.
41
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Mapara and Khelawon to refashion the law of hearsay. The twin concepts
of necessity and reliability are central to the Court’s approach. Crossexamination is the preferred method by which the trustworthiness of a
speaker or statement is assessed. As Charron J. put it in Khelawon, “our
adversary system is based on the assumption that sources of untrustworthiness or inaccuracy can best be brought to light under the test of crossexamination. It is mainly because of the inability to put hearsay evidence
to that test, that it is presumptively inadmissible”.48 Reliable hearsay evidence is therefore evidence for which there is a substitute for crossexamination that would justify its admission. Very generally, if a hearsay
statement fits one of the traditional exceptions, it is admissible provided
that the exception itself complies with the requirements of the principled
approach. If a hearsay exception is not relied upon, then the hearsay
statement may be admissible provided the statement satisfies the principled approach, that is, provided the statement is necessary and reliable.
More particularly, according to the Supreme Court in Khelawon, the
principled approach’s governing framework for hearsay is as follows:
(a) Hearsay evidence is presumptively inadmissible unless it falls
under an exception to the hearsay rule. The traditional exceptions
to the hearsay rule remain presumptively in place.
(b) A hearsay exception can be challenged to determine whether it is
supported by indicia of necessity and reliability, required by the
principled approach. The exception can be modified as necessary
to bring it into compliance.
(c) In “rare cases”, evidence falling within an existing exception may
be excluded because the indicia of necessity and reliability are
lacking in the particular circumstances of the case.
(d) If hearsay evidence does not fall under a hearsay exception, it may
still be admitted if indicia of reliability and necessity are
established on a voir dire.49

The principal effect of the principled approach — especially clause
(d) — is to allow some necessary and reliable hearsay statements to be
admitted where they would not have been admissible under the traditional exceptions.

48
49

Khelawon, supra, note 38, at para. 48.
Id., at para. 42, citing Mapara, supra, note 45, at para. 15.
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With this account in hand, let me return to Tapper’s criticism of the
principled approach. Tapper in effect makes two complaints. First, he
argues that using considerations of reliability and necessity to justify
specific exceptions to the rule excluding hearsay is not the same as using
the principled approach. Although particular exceptions may be justified
because they permit necessary and reliable evidence to be admitted, allowing judges to assess necessity and reliability confers on them too
much discretion. Similarly, Tapper suggests the Court was incorrect in
assuming that considerations of necessity and reliability are the basis of
Wigmore’s explanation of exceptions to the rule. Tapper observes that
“[w]hile it may be true that such considerations played their part in
moulding the rule and its exceptions, it is quite another matter to abandon the lower level rules so moulded in favour of reversion to these
concepts themselves”.50
Second, Tapper claims that because the terms and concepts employed
by the principled approach “are vague and require elaboration in the context of each set of different facts” the epistemic values of predictability
and certainty have been lost. As a result, Tapper concludes that the principled approach to hearsay is in tension with the rule of law. Again, this
is because the rule of law requires that legal rules be general, and that
their application be predictable, requirements that in Tapper’s view the
principled approach to hearsay cannot meet.
In my view, however, neither criticism withstands scrutiny. Let
me begin with Tapper’s complaint that the Court was wrong to rely on
Wigmore in the manner it did. It seems to me that Tapper misrepresents
the relation between the requirements of necessity and reliability and the
traditional hearsay exceptions. The principled approach does not abandon
what Tapper calls the “lower level rules” or traditional exceptions; to the
contrary, if a putative hearsay statement fits into one of those rules or
exceptions then according to the principled approach the statement ought
to be received into evidence unless it is neither reliable nor necessary.
The principled approach modifies, but does not abandon, the traditional
exceptions.51 As Charron J. says in Khelawon, “the traditional rules of evidence reflect considerable wisdom and judicial experience. The modern
approach has built upon their underlying rationale, not discarded it.”52

50
51
52

Tapper, supra, note 1, at 72.
See, in particular, Starr, supra, note 44.
Khelawon, supra, note 38, at para. 59.
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Second, the idea that the traditional exceptions must be unified by
and therefore manifest some deeper principle makes both legal and theoretical sense. To see why, compare the situation with respect to hearsay to
the situation in the law of negligence. In Donoghue v. Stevenson, the
House of Lords was confronted with an argument that it ought to acknowledge a broader conception of the duty of care than had previously
been recognized. In accepting that argument, Lord Atkin famously
said the following: “At present I content myself with pointing out that in
English law there must be, and is, some general conception of relations
giving rise to a duty of care, of which the particular cases found in the
books are but instances.”53 The general conception in question was the
neighbour principle, which Lord Atkin memorably glossed as follows:
The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must
not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer’s question, Who is my
neighbour? receives a restricted reply. … Who, then, in law is my
neighbour? The answer seems to be — persons who are so closely and
directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in
contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the
acts or omissions which are called in question.54

In short, in reaching their conclusion in Donoghue v. Stevenson, the
House of Lords concluded that the various categories of negligence, if
they were to make sense, must be unified by some underlying normative
principle.
The argument of the Supreme Court in Khan, Smith, Starr and
Khelawon that there must be some underlying concept shared by the traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule parallels the argument in
Donoghue v. Stevenson. Tapper’s complaint that it is a mistake to revert
to these concepts themselves therefore seems odd. If the traditional
exceptions are coherent as exceptions they must be linked together
somehow, and Wigmore’s indicia of necessity and reliability seem to do
precisely that. Indeed, by articulating a general principle that unifies the
traditional exceptions, the principled approach better meets the rule of
law’s desideratum of generality emphasized by Fuller, among others.
To this it might be objected that the foregoing misrepresents Tapper’s
complaint.55 According to this objection, Tapper’s claim is not that the

53
54
55

Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 at 580, [1932] All E.R. Rep. 1 (H.L.).
Id.
I am indebted here to discussion with Graham Mayeda.
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categorical exceptions cannot be unified but that it is better to have
judges apply particular rules rather than broad principles. This objection
holds that the application of those principles allows judges too much discretion and could be used to admit evidence that goes beyond the specific
exceptions. Even though evidence is reliable and necessary there may be
countervailing considerations against admitting certain classes of that
hearsay evidence. It is difficult to know what to make of this complaint
largely because an acknowledged consequence of the principled approach to hearsay is that statements that would have been inadmissible
under the categorical approach may become admissible under the principled approach. Thus, to cite as a “countervailing consideration” the fact
that some hearsay admitted under the principled approach would not
have been admitted under the categorical approach is either questionbegging — this, after all, is the point of the principled approach — or
irrelevant, since it does not reflect badly on the indicia of necessity and
reliability. To be sure, there may be a concern that too much hearsay will
be admitted on the principled approach because it will become too easy
to meet the requirements of reliability and necessity. And perhaps this is
Tapper’s worry. But by the same token, one might worry that too much
hearsay will be admitted if the categorical approach is adopted, since
meeting one of the categorical exceptions is no guarantee that the statement in question is in fact trustworthy.
Tapper’s second criticism is slightly different, although it is related to
the preceding complaint. In brief, Tapper alleges that the adoption of the
principled approach to hearsay is in tension with the rule of law on the
grounds that it has, in his terminology, “thrown the whole of Canadian
law in this area into the melting pot”.56 By this Tapper means that the
appeal to flexible and general concepts such as necessity and reliability
has taxed the resources of the courts. It has resulted in an enormous increase in litigation and required courts to hold a voir dire whenever a
question of the admissibility of a hearsay statement arises on the principled
approach. The objection, in short, is that the principled approach to hearsay is inconsistent with the rule of law because it makes the law more
difficult to understand and apply, and because the considerations on
which the principled approach is based, although appropriately general,

56

Tapper, supra, note 1, at 72.
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require giving too much power to judges.57 What are we to make of this
criticism?
It seems to me that the criticism is only as good as the particular vision of the rule of law on which it rests. Tapper’s concern seems mainly
to be about the costs that the principled approach imposes when those
principles are applied to particular situations. His worry is that the principled approach makes disagreement more likely because judges will
admit contentious evidence that appears to satisfy the general principles
and that such disagreement makes the criminal process more protracted
and burdensome. To the extent that the rule of law is designed to particularize rules and principles, to turn “moral values and prescriptions into
justiciable rules”, this may very well be a concern. But it is a concern
only if we accept an instrumental conception of the rule of law that locates its virtue in efficiency, clarity and justiciability.58 If instead we view
the rule of law as an abstract form of moral association, then the fact that
a legal institution or rule imposes costs of a certain kind on participants
should be irrelevant. The concern should instead be whether the law of
hearsay evidence is compatible with the normative ideal expressed by the
rule of law.
These observations are somewhat defensive, amounting to the claim
that for all that Tapper has argued, the principled approach to hearsay may
be compatible with the rule of law. But can a positive argument be given for
the conclusion that the principled approach and the rule of law are
compatible? I believe it can. According to the picture I am sketching, the
rule of law governs interactions between individuals by virtue of the roles
they occupy. And some of the roles occupied by individuals in the criminal
trial are those of judge, juror, accused, witness and victim. With this in
mind, consider how a judge might approach the question whether to allow a
hearsay statement S to be introduced into evidence against an accused. If
the judge admits S into evidence without the benefit of cross-examination
or without engaging in a voir dire to determine whether S is necessary and
reliable, she is displaying a lack of respect for the accused. By admitting S
the judge is expressing the view that certain concerns of the accused — that
he not be wrongly labelled or stigmatized as a criminal, or have his liberty
unjustly curtailed, for example — can be treated in a less than cautious
57
Says Tapper, the principles “exist at such a high level of generality that they can easily be
agreed upon in advance, but at the expense of potential disagreement at the point of their application
to particular situations”: id., at 73.
58
See again Raz, supra, note 14.
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manner. On the other hand, by engaging in a voir dire to determine whether
S is necessary and reliable the judge shows concern for the accused by
ensuring that S, which might reflect detrimentally on the accused, meets a
threshold of trustworthiness. But such displays of concern and respect are
precisely what the rule of law, understood as a form of moral association,
demands: it requires individuals to treat individuals in particular ways based
on the roles that they happen to occupy.
By way of further unpacking the foregoing let me return to a consideration of what the hearsay rule is designed to do. At a minimum, it is
designed to exclude certain forms of otherwise relevant evidence, and
thereby guard against the inclusion of unreliable evidence in the trial
process. If the trial is a search for the truth, and if unreliable evidence is
admitted into the record, then it is more likely that the search for truth
will be compromised. Indeed, if we recall Wigmore’s remarks, quoted
above, this would seem to be the perspective adopted by him: what the
inflexibility of the hearsay rule results in is the “needless obstruction to
investigation of truth”.
This perspective is clearly that of the external systems engineer. It
views the trial from an epistemic perspective, and evaluates particular
rules based on their epistemic value. But as we have seen, another perspective is available: the internal perspective of the fact-finder as a moral
agent. From this perspective the trial is an attempt to reach a just verdict
in a manner that respects justice. What does this require? At a minimum,
it requires that judges adopt a stance of respect towards the accused.59 As
Ho puts it: “The court cares to know the truth about an allegation because it cares about the party to whom acceptance of the allegation is
harmful. The degree of caution it exercises in accepting the allegation is
reflective of the measure of respect and concern it has for that person.”60
When a judge makes a determination of fact, or in her role as trier of
law instructs the trier of fact on the proper interpretation of a legal rule or
principle, she must always keep in mind that any ultimate conclusions
that are reached are reached on the basis of inferences. It is true that the
inferences in question are often to conclusions regarding matters of fact
59

For a similar perspective on the rules of evidence and the trial process, see again Stewart,
supra, note 6. As Stewart puts it, “the rules of evidence and procedure for the criminal trial in a
rightful condition cannot be designed solely to reach an outcome, or to satisfy the public’s desire for
a reassuring narrative of righting wrong or restoring order, or even to find out the truth — though
they may indeed achieve all of these purposes — but they must also be consistent with the rights of
the participants”: id., at 180.
60
Ho, supra, note 7, at 282-83.
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concerning whether an accused did the things that he is claimed to have
done. But because such inferences lead to conclusions that can have serious consequences for the accused, including deprivation of liberty, they
also have normative implications. Hearsay statements highlight this
problem starkly. When a hearsay statement is offered into evidence, its
content is accepted as true, and on that basis the trier of fact is asked to
accept the truth of some further proposition. But such an inference must
be approached cautiously, given what is at stake. In preventing certain
forms of relevant evidence from being considered by the trier of fact, the
hearsay rule may compromise the truth-finding function of the criminal
trial. At the same time, however, it ensures that any conclusion regarding
the imposition of punishment on a particular accused will be adequately
justified in light of the important interests involved. A conception of the
rule of law as a form of moral association reflects this idea. Triers of law
and triers of fact must do their best to ensure that any verdict reached is
morally justified, and that in reaching a verdict the moral status of the
affected individual is adequately respected. And to do this is to enter into
a relationship that is both abstract — applying to individuals by virtue of
the roles that they occupy — and moral, in the sense that it requires the
adoption of a certain ethical stance with respect to individuals on whom
the state is seeking to impose punishment. And my claim is that this is
nothing more than Oakeshott’s conception of the rule of law understood
as a form of moral association.
To this it might be objected that this analysis is entirely too abstract.
For even if Oakeshott’s conception of the rule of law justifies the rule
that hearsay statements should be admitted cautiously if at all, it might be
argued that it does not explain why the principled approach in particular
is to be preferred to the categorical approach that it seeks to displace.
Two things are worth noting here. First, I have provided some reasons for
thinking that the principled approach to hearsay constitutes an improvement over the categorical approach. These reasons are based not on the
rule of law, but on the fact that the principled approach unifies, using the
indicia of reliability and necessity, categories and exceptions that might
initially seem to be distinct. And this, it seems to me, is a step forward in
understanding the basis of the hearsay rule. But second, and more to the
point, explaining why the principled approach is preferable to the categorical approach from the perspective of the rule of law is no part of my
argument. If I am right that in dealing with hearsay, triers of law and triers of fact must adopt an appropriate ethical stance towards affected
individuals, and if this ethical stance is consistent with the categorical
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approach, then there would seem to be no rule of law objection to adopting the categorical approach.

VI. CONCLUSION
My goal in this paper has been to show that an attractive and
plausible conception of the rule of law is consistent with the principled
approach to hearsay. I argued against Colin Tapper’s criticism of the
principled approach by demonstrating that it rests on an instrumental
concept of the rule of law. I then suggested that if we adopt Michael
Oakeshott’s normative conception of the rule of law, the principled approach to hearsay can be reconciled with it. This is not to say that only
the principled approach to hearsay is consistent with the rule of law thus
understood; there may be other ways to structure the hearsay inquiry that
would also conform to this interpretation of the rule of law. But it does
show that appeals to the virtues of efficiency and justiciability do not
show that the principled approach to hearsay is deficient from the perspective of the rule of law.
In the background of this argument lie several other claims: that the
primary purpose of the criminal trial is normative rather than epistemic;
that an internal perspective on the criminal trial — which views judges as
role-players within a system, and procedural and evidential rules as expressing normative principles — is preferable to an external perspective,
which views the trial as primarily an epistemic tool designed to ferret out
the truth; and that to judge requires the adoption of a particular ethical
stance towards the participants in the trial process. These claims form a
package of sorts. For they emphasize that when thinking about the criminal trial we must not lose sight of the fact that we are judging persons,
and that somebody’s being a person, and occupying a particular role in
the criminal process, requires us to treat that individual in certain ways.
The principled approach to hearsay can be complicated and unwieldy.
But in its insistence that hearsay be admitted only when it meets the twin
criteria of necessity and reliability it emphasizes the importance of reaching just verdicts in a manner that reflects justice. Courts fail to respect
the accused if they use an out of court statement as the foundation of an
inference that adversely affects the accused without ensuring that the
statement or its maker is trustworthy. To do so is to treat this particular
inference as one that can be made in an incautious and casual manner.
And that is not a manifestation of the rule of law, but an exception to it.

